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SOME ASPECTS OF THE STATUS OF
CHILDREN IN MISSOURI'
Every individual occupies in the law a certain position or
relation with reference to other individuals, which legal position
or relation may be called his status. From his status the law
determines "his capacity for the acquisition, and exercise of
legal rights and for the performance of legal acts."2 Since
it is a legal relation, status is created by law and not by nature.
In some instances the law has created a status in the absence
of any natural relationship between the parties affected. 3 In
other instances a natural relation, such as that of parent and
child, has been made the basis for the creation of a status, tho
this result does not always follow merely because such a natural
relation exists.
In two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri,
Drake v. Milton Hospital Association 4 and Lindsley v. Patterson,5 some of the problems arising in connection with the
position of illegitimate and adopted children have been discussed. This study will deal with the various kinds of status
of children in Missouri law, the condition under which each
may come into existence, and the rights of inheritance which
flow from each of them.
I

LEGITIMACY

Children are either natural or adopted. Natural children
are either legitimate or illegitimate. A legitimate child may be
either one born such or one who becomes such after its birth.
1. This study has been undertaken in connection with the work of
the Children's Code Commission appointed by the Governor in 1915,
to recommend to the General Assembly a complete code of laws relating
to children.

2. Dicey, Conflict of Laws (2d ed.) p. 458. See also Niboyet v.
Niboyet (1878) 4 Prob. Div. 1, 11; Minor, Conflict of Laws, § 68.
3.
4.
5.

Tiffany, Persons, p. 213.
(1915) 178 S. W. 462.
(1915) 177 S. W. 826.
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1. Children born legitimate. In Missouri a legitimate child
has been held to be "one born in lawful wedlock, or of a widow
within ten months after the death of her husband, or born before
the marriage of its parents who afterwards marry and receives
the recognition of its father." 6 This probably does not mean
that a child born of a widow within ten months after the death
of her husband is necessarily legitimate. It may not, in fact,
have been begotten until after the husband's death. Perhaps
a more accurate phrasing of the first part of the definition would
be this: a legitimate child is one born or begotten during the
lawful wedlock of its parents. Only such children were legitimate at common law. 7

Children born of parents unmarried at

the time of birth were illegitimate at common law and remained
so notwithstanding the subsequent marriage of their parents.
Altho under both the ecclesiastical and the civil law children
were legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents,
the common law has persisted in its refusal to recognize the possibility of legitimation under such circumstances. 8 The common law doctrine has, however, been superseded in many states
by statutes which legitimate children born out of wedlock either
upon the marriage of their parents, or upon such marriage and
recognition by the father. 9
2.

Legitimation by subsequent marriage and recognition.

The Missouri statute provides that "if a man, having by a
woman a child or children, shall afterwards intermarry with her
and shall recognize such child or children to be his, they shall
thereby be legitimated." 10 It will be seen that the illegitimate
6. Gates v. Seibert (1900) 157 Mo. 254, 272.
7. 2 Kent, Commentaries (13th ed.) 210.
8. "Quod nolunt leges Angliae mnutare, quae "huc usque usitatae
sunt et approbatae." Statute of Merton (1236) 20 Hen. III, c. 9. However, legitimation was possible by act of Parliament. 2 Kent, Com-

mentaries (13th ed.) *209. Special acts for the legitimation or adoption of children are prohibited in Missouri. Constitution of 1875, art. 4,
§ 53 (9).
9.

1 Stimson, American Statute Law, § 6631.

10. Revised Statutes 1909, § 341. This section first appears in an
act regulating descents and distribution, passed January 21, 1815, as
follows: "And when a man shall have one or more children by a
woman, and shall afterwards intermarry with such woman, such child
or children, if recognized by him shall be thereby legitimated, and
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child can become the legitimate child of its father only upon
the marriage of the father and mother followed by recognition
by the father. Three things must therefore be established: (1)
(2) a marriage of the parents; (3) recognition
paternity;"
by the father. Should there be a failure to show any one of
these, there is no legitimation.
Proof of the paternity of a child born or begotten in lawful wedlock is greatly aided by the presumption of legitimacy.
Such a child is presumed to be the legitimate child of its mother's
husband, unless there is evidence to the contrary. It was formerly held in England that the presumption could not be overthrown except by proof that the husband was "beyond the four
seas," i. e., outside of the jurisdiction of the king, during the
whole time in which the child by possibility might have been
begotten. 12 But it has recently been held in England that "if the
husband could, from circumstances of time, place and health have
had nuptial intercourse with his wife, and there be no evidence
to prove that he did not have such intercourse, he must be considered the father of her child, even if she has committed adultery
with one, two or twenty other men." 13 Evidence as to the husband's impotency will rebut the presumption, and so will evidence
as to lack of opportunity of access; but such evidence must
be strong and satisfactory.'
In the United States the presumption exists but is not conclusive,1 5 and the extent to which it is rebuttable is not certain. 16
capable of inheriting." Territorial Laws, p. 402, § 16. The words "and
capable of inheriting" were omitted in Revised Statutes 1825, p. 328.
In the revision of 1835, the section appears in the Chapter on Descents
and Distribution in the exact words now used. Revised Statutes 1835,
p. 223, § 9.
11.

Mooney v. Mooney (1912)

(Minn., 1915) 153 N. W. 593.
(Ind. App. Ct., 191.2)

244 Mo. 372; In re Reid's Estate

But see contra, Haddon v. Crawford

97 N. E. 811.

12. 4 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2527; Lawson, Presumptive Evidence,
§ 108 et seq.
13. Gordon v. Gordon (1903) Probate 141, quoting Nicolas,
Adulterine Bastardy, p. 186. Cannaan v. Avery (1904) 72 N. H. 59,
accord.
14.

2 Halsbury, Laws of England, 427.

15. Bunel v. O'Day (1903) 125 Fed. 303, 317. Contra, In re Henry's
Estate (Iowa, 1914) 149 N. W. 605.
16. 4 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2527. Rebutting evidence must satisfy
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Shaw (Vt., 1915) 94 Atl. 434. See
also, Cave v. Cave (S. C., 1915) 85 S. E. 244.
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It can be rebutted by proof of non-access or of impotency.' 7
Suppose the child is born so soon after marriage that it could
not possibly have been begotten during the marriage, does the
presumption of legitimacy obtain? It seems settled that it does,1 s
and this may be justified as a measure for protecting the child,
but the authorities are divided as to the weight of evidence
necessary to rebut the presumption. In Dennison v. Page,' 9
it was said that the presumption was not even weakened by the
fact that conception had taken place prior to marriage and that
if the man who became the husband had access prior to the
marriage, the child is conclusively proved to be his. By access,
the court probably meant sexual intercourse. Absence of sexual
0
intercourse must be shown clearly. But in Wright v. Hicks,'
the court held that a difference should be made between postnuptial and ante-nuptial conception, and that much slighter proof
may rebut the presumption of legitimacy if the conception is
21
it
ante-nuptial. In the recent case of Jackson v. Thornton,
was held that a mere preponderance of evidence is not sufficient
22
to rebut the presumption.
17. Drake v. Milton Hospital Assn. (1915) 178 S. W. 462; but in
Bunel v. O'Day (1903) 125 Fed. 303, the court intimates that if the
absence of sexual intercourse is shown by indubitable evidence it is
Immaterial that there was a possibility of access. But in view of the
rule of evidence that neither husband or wife may testify to the fact
that no sexual intercourse between them had taken place, People v.
Case (1912) 171 Mich. 282, it would seem to be practically impossible to
prove an absence of sexual intercourse where there is possibility of
access.
18. Jackson v. Thornton (Tenn., 1915) 179 S. W. 384; Wallace v.
Wallace (1908) 137 Iowa 37; McCulloch v. McCulloch (1888) 69 Tex.
682; Wilson v. Babb (1882) 18 S. C. 59; Dennison v. Page (1857) 29 Pa.
420; Wright v. Hicks (1854) 15 Ga. 160. In Zachmann v. Zachmann
(1903) 201 Ill. 380, the child, tho born in wedlock, was begotten during
a former marriage and was held to be the legitimate child of the second
husband.
19. (1857) 29 Pa. 420.
20. (1854) 15 Ga. 160.
21. (Tenn., 1915) 179 S. W. 384.
22. The husband and wife are both incapable of testifying as to
sexual intercourse, even tho the conception be ante-nuptial; and their
declarations as to this are also inadmissible. Wallace v. Wallace (1908)
137 Ia. 37; Dennison v. Page (1857) 29 Pa. 420. But the admissions of
the wife as to actual intercourse before marriage with men other than
her husband are admissible in a divorce proceeding based upon her
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A man's recognition of a child as his own is some evidence
of parentage.23 In Adger v. Ackerman,24 a case involving the
construction of the Missouri statute, Thayer, J., in a concurring opinion held that "the legislature intended to give acts of
recognition the effect of evidence of a very decisive character."
He found it unnecessary to decide that recognition was conclusive evidence of paternity, but held that it placed the child so
recognized "in the same favorable position as one born during
wedlock" and "it can only be rendered a bastard, after such
recognition, by the same kind of proof which is required to
overturn the legitimacy of a child born in the course of wedlock;
and it is entitled to the benefit of the same presumption." This
conclusion was approved by the Supreme Court of Missouri in
Breidenstcin v. Bertram25 and in Drake v. Milton Hospital

Association.26 In the latter case, it was held that altho there was
no direct evidence tending to show that the mother of the child
and the man whom she afterwards married were acquainted at
the time when the child must have been begotten, yet as they lived
in the same city there was opportunity for access, and as the
child after recognition stood in the same position as a child born
in lawful wedlock and was entitled to the same presumption,
the presumption as to its paternity was not rebutted by lack of
such direct evidence of acquaintanceship. However, the presumption of paternity created by recognition may be rebutted by
proof of the impotency of the man, and possibly by any evidence
that it was otherwise impossible for him to have been the father
27
of the child.
The parents of the child must marry before the child can be
legitimated by recognition and this marriage must be a valid
marriage. If either party. has a husband or wife living at the
pregnancy at the time of marriage. Wallace v. Wallace, supra. It was
held in Wright v. Hicks (1854) 15 Ga. 160, 171, that declarations of
husband and wife were admissible after death, but that neither could
testify during life, nor could their declarations then be used.
23. Stein's Admr. v. Stein (Ky., 1908) 106 S. W. 860.
24. (1902) 115 Fed. 124, 136.
25. (1906) 198 Mo. 328.
26. (1915) 178 S. W. 462.
27. Drake v. Milton Hospital Assn. (1915) 178 S. W. 462.
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time of the marriage, 28 or if the marriage is void because one
party is white and the other black, 29 children previously born
are not legitimated. A ceremony is not essential to the validity
of a Missouri marriage. Common law marriages are as valid
as those which are ceremonial;30 but in order to constitute a
valid common law marriage, it must be shown that there was
cohabitation with an intent to marry and not merely to indulge
in casual sexual intercourse."1 In all of the cases in Missouri
involving the legitimation of children by the subsequent marriage of their parents and recognition by the father, the marriage
of the parents seems to have been ceremonial. Probably no
distinction would be taken between a ceremonial marriage and
one valid at common law in determining whether legitimation
results.
The circumstances constituting or evidencing recognition by
the father are too varied to be stated in, detail with any degree of
completeness. Should the natural father call the child "daughter,"
or have her baptized in his name, or give her away in marriage,
such conduct is evidence of recognition.32 In general, any word
or act which shows that the husband accepted the child or held
it out as his own offspring evidences recognition. The Missouri
statute does not require that recognition be in writing, nor is
any formality necessary.'"
Drake v. Milton Hospital Association, 34 recently decided
by the Missouri Supreme Court, raises an interesting and important question. Can adulterine bastards, i. e., children born or
begotten when one of the parents was married to some one else
not the father or mother of the child, be legitimated by sub28.
(1908)
29.
30.
31.
35 Mo.
32.
33.

Adams v. Adams (1891) 154 Mass. 290; Olmsted v. Olmsted
190 N. Y. 459.
Greenhow v. James (1885) 80 Va. 616.
Bishop v. Brittain Investment Co. (1910) 229 Mo. 699.
Nelson v. Jones (1912) 245 Mo. 579; Buchanan v. Harvey (1864)
276.
Drake v. Milton Hospital Assn. (1915) 178 S. W. 462.
In Michigan, Howell's Annotated Statutes (2d ed.) § 10962,

recognition must be in writing acknowledged and executed as a deed
and recorded in the office of the probate judge. A general, notorious,
or written recognition is necessary in Kansas. Kansas General Statutes
1901, § 254.
34. (1915) 178 S. W. 462.
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sequent marriage and recognition,?

Such illegitimate children

1
can not be so legitimated under the law of Scotland, nor under
the Roman-Dutch law nor under the civil codes of Belgium,
Holland, Spain, Portugal or Italy.3 6 By the French Civil Code,
adulterine bastards may be legitimated by subsequent marriage
only when born more than three hundred days after the date
of an order authorizing separate residence of the first husband
and his wife, the mother of the child, in an action which results
in a decree of separation or divorce; but a child born during
marriage may be legitimated by subsequent marriage of the wife
a7
In Drake
with the adulterer if the first husband disavows it.
3
v. Milton Hospital Association, 8 the statement of facts shows
that the supposed natural father of the child was married at the
time the child was born. The question seems not to have been
specifically considered by the court, which, however, held that
the subsequent marriage of the natural father to the mother
of the child after the death of the natural father's first wife,
followed by recognition by the father legitimated the child.
The fact that the father's marriage to his first wife was a slave
marriage somewhat lessens the value of the case as a precedent.
It is not clear whether the mother of the child was married at
the time of its birth.
Decisions in the United States involving this question are
not numerous. In Louisiana, illegitimate children born of an
adulterous intercourse are not legitimated by subsequent marIn Kentucky, under a statute similar to the one in
riage."0
Missouri, it has been held that illegitimate children born while
the father was married to a woman not their mother were not
legitimated by the subsequent lawful marriage of their parents
40
In Maryland 41 and in Illinois 42
and recognition by the father.

a contrary conclusion has been reached.

In the Kentucky,

Erskine, Principles (21st ed.) p. 104.
Burge, Colonial and Foreign Law (new ed.) p. 350, 357, note q.
Burge, Colonial and Foreign Law (new ed.) p. 352.
(1915) 178 S.W. 462.
Fletcher's succession (1856) 11 La. Ann. 59.
40. Sams v. Sams (1887) 85 Ky. 396; Hall v. Hall (1904) 82 S. W.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
300.

41. Hawbecker v. Hawbecker (1875) 43 Md. 516.
42. Miller v. Pennington (1905) 218 I1. 220.
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Maryland and Illinois cases the father was married and the
mother unmarried at the time the child was begotten. In Ives v.
McNicoll4 a at the time the child was born the mother was married to a man not the natural father of the child and it was held
that the child was legitimated by the subsequent lawful marriage
of its parents and recognition by its father. It was found as a
fact that the mother and her first husband had not lived together
for about six years before the child was born. Accordingly, it
cannot be said that Ives v. McNicoll decides anything more than
that if the circumstances show that it was impossible for the first
husband to have been the father of the child, the child may be
legitimated by the subsequent lawful marriage of its parents and
44
recognition by its natural father.
If, however, the first husband could possibly have been the
father of the child, does if then follow that a subsequent lawful
marriage between the mother and a man who may have been the
father of the child will legitimate the child if the second husband
recognizes it as his own? The difficulty of establishing with reasonable certainty the actual paternity of the child may possibly
45
It
make it desirable that there should be some distinction.
is doubtful, however, whether such a distinction can be drawn
under the statute which provides that legitimation results from
the subsequent marriage of a man with the mother of his children, followed by recognition by him, without restricting it to
instances in which the mother of the children was unmarried at
the time they were born, or if married, was not cohabiting with
her husband. If some such distinction is not made, however, a
child begotten at a time when there was a possibility of access
by its mother's first husband, and hence presumptively the legitimate child of such husband and as such entitled to inherit as
his heir, may be deprived of its inheritance by the marriage of its
43. (1899) 59 Ohio St. 402.
44. Vide ante, p. 6, note 18.
45. There is a suggestion as to such a distinction in Stones Y.
Keeling (Va., 1804) 5 Call 143, 148. A recognition even in writing by
the mother's second husband will not overcome the presumption of
legitimacy if the child was born in lawful wedlock, unless the nonaccess of the husband was established by the clearest and most conclusive evidence. Bethany Hospital Co. v. Swarts (1902) 64 Kan. 367.
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mother to a second husband, followed by recognition! by such
second husband as by such recognition it becomes presumptively
the legitimate child of the second husband. This difficulty seems
to arise from the excessive weight given in Breidenstein v. Bertram 46 and Drake v. Milton Hospital Association 47 to the mere
fact of recognition. If recognition should be regarded merely as
evidence of paternity and not as creating a presumption of paternity, the difficulty would perhaps be obviated. It may be said
to this that there is no reason why the child should cease to be
the legitimate child of its mother's first husband when it is
recognized by the mother's second husband, but it does not seem
desirable that there should exist a rule of law permitting it to be
found that a child may be the natural born legitimate child of
two fathers.
A child legitimated by subsequent marriage and recognition becomes legitimate for all purposes. 48 But at what time does
its legitimacy begin? Does legitimacy under such circumstances
relate back to the time of birth, or does it become effective only
from the time of recognition? These questions cannot be
answered with exactness as they seem not to have been considered in Missouri and no decisions have been found in other
states. In Scotland where subsequent marriage legitimates even
without recognition, legitimation operates only from the marriage; it does not relate back. 49 Probably American courts will
take the same view of the matter and hold that legitimation is
effective only from the time of recognition, if recognition is
necessary, or from marriage if recognition is not necessary.
Another question suggests itself in this connection: does
recognition of a child dead at the time of recognition make the
issue of such child legitimate descendants of the natural grandfather? It seems reasonably clear that the statute requires that
recognition must be during the child's lifetime and that there
can be no legitimation of the descendants of a bastard by the
46.
47.
48.
49.
Laws of

(1906) 198 Mo. 328.
(1915) 178 S. W. 462.
Gates v. Seibert (1900) 157 Mo. 254.
Shedden v. Patrick (1854) 1 Maeq. 535, 623.
England, 437, note g.

See 2 Halsbury,
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marriage of its parents and the recognition of such descendants
as the children of the illegitimate child of their natural father.
By what law is legitimation determined? If the acts done
by the father are sufficient to legitimate by the law of his
domicile at the time, it is immaterial that by the law of the
child's domicile at that time the child could not have been
legitimated by any act done by the father.50 But it has been
held in England that by the law of the domicile of the father
at the time of the child's birth there must have existed a capacity
for legitimation. Hence, legitimation was held to take place only
when both by the law of the father's domicile at the time of the
birth of the child and by the law of the father's domicile at the
time of the acts alleged to constitute legitimation the possibility
of legitimation is recognized. In addition, the acts of legitimation must be those established by the law of the father's
domicile at the time he acts. It is doubtful whether American courts will go to the full length of Re Grove.61 It is not unlikely that they will hold that all that is necessary is that legitimation be possible by the law of the father's domicile at the
time he does the act alleged to result in legitimation and hence
that legitimation takes place when the acts prescribed by such law
52
are done.
3. Children of a void marriage. Besides those born legitimate and those made legitimate by the subsequent marriage of
their parents and recognition by the father, there is another
class of legitimate children under the law of Missouri, those
born of a marriage which is regarded by the law as null and
void. The children of such marriages are illegitimate at common
law. 53

The statute accomplishing this result provides that "the

issue of all marriages decreed null in law, or dissolved by
divorce shall be legitimate." 54 This statute was first enacted in
1822, 55 but the original statute differs somewhat in phraseology
from the present one. Where the present statute has the word
50. Blythe v. Ayres (1892) 96 Cal. 532.
51. (1888) 40 Ch. D. 216.
52. See, Eddie v. Eddie (N. D., 1899) 79 N. W. 856.
53. Tiffany, Law of Persons, p. 215.
54. Revised Statutes 1909, § 342.
55. Territorial Laws, p. 858.

STATUS OF CHILDREN

"decreed" the original statute had "deemed." "Deemed" was
used until the revision of 1865 51 when "decreed" was substituted.57 Suggestions that the change in phraseology had worked
a change in the law were made in Pratt v. Pratt,1s but it seems
now settled that "deemed" and "decreed" are not materially
different in meaning; 59 so that if the evidence shows such a
state of facts as would justify a decree declaring the marriage
null and void, it is immaterial that there has been no such decree,
and the children of such a marriage are legitimate notwithstanding.
Who are included within the term "issue"? Children born
after a void marriage entered into before the enactment of the
statute are included.0 9 But are children who were born before the
marriage of their parents to be regarded as the issue of such
marriage and hence legitimate should the marriage be null and
void? It would seem that the statute 61 provides that only those
children born after the marriage are legitimate notwithstanding
the nullity of such marriage. Children born before the marriage can hardly be called issue of the marriage. 62 Such children are probably not legitimated by subsequent marriage and
recognition unless the subsequent marriage is valid,6 3 and hence
it follows that while children born after a void marriage of
their parents are legitimate those born before such marriage,
even tho their father recognizes them, are not legitimated.
Children are not legitimate under the statute unless there
has been a marriage between their parents. This marriage need
not be a ceremonial one. A void common law marriage will be
as effective as a void ceremonial one in making the issue of the
marriage legitimate. 64 Nor does it seem to be at all necessary
56. Revised Statutes 1825, p. 828, § 8; Revised Statutes 1835, p. 223,
§ 10; Revised Statutes 1845, p. 422, § 10; Revised Statutes 1855, p. 661,

§ 10.

57.
58.
59.
Mo. 579.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

General Statutes 1865, p. 519, § 11.
(1878) 5 Mo. App. 539.
Green v. Green (1894) 126 Mo. 17; Nelson v. Jones (1912)

Linecum v. Linecum (1834) 3 Mo. 441.
Revised Statutes 1909, § 342.
Greenhow v. James (1885) 80 Va. 636, 638.
See p. 10.
Nelson v. Jones (1912) 245 Mo. 579.

24S
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that the marriage be one which would have been valid if celebration or cohabitation had taken place in Missouri. The offspring
of a white man and an Indian woman married according to
Indian customs are legitimate, altho a marriage which is to last
only so long as the husband wills, which is the case with Indian
marriages, would not be valid if such a marriage was contracted
between white persons in Missouri. 5 Children of a white man
and of his two polygamous Indian wives are notwithstanding
legitimate.6 6 In the cases of Indian marriages just referred to,
the legitimacy of the children does not depend entirely and probably not at all upon the statute, but upon the broad principle
that the children of a marriage valid according to the law of the
place where it is celebrated are legitimate everywhere unless
67
some overriding public policy of the forum interferes.
At common law marriages which are not valid are either
void or voidable.0 8 A void marriage is one which is absolutely
null from the beginning without any decree of nullity. The
children of such a marriage are illegitimate and cohabitation between the parents is unlawful. A voidable marriage is one which
is valid until declared a nullity by some competent court. When
once set aside, it is treated as void ab initio and the children
are illegitimate. But if not set aside during the lifetime of the
parties, the children remain legitimate. In view of this hardship
upon the offspring the tendency today is to regard invalid marriages as voidable rather than void and perhaps even to go
further and to regard many marriages which would have been
voidable at common law as valid. An impediment which would
have made the marriage voidable or void at common law is
65. Johnson v. Johnson's Administrator (1860) 30 Mo. 72.; Boyer
v. Dively (1875) 58 Mo. 510; La Rivi~re v. LaRiviire (1883) 77 Mo. 512.
But if the cohabitation upon which a marriage according to Indian
customs is based, takes place entirely outside of the tribe and within
Missouri, inasmuch as the husband may divorce the wife at his will,
it will not be regarded as a marriage at all and hence the children are
Illegitimate. Banks v. Galbreath (1899) 149 Mo. 529. Contra as to the
invalidity of an Indian marriage outside of tribal limits, La Riviere v.
La Riviere (1888) 97 Mo. 80.
66. Buchanan v. Harvey (1864) 35 Mo. 276.
67. Minor, Conflict of Laws, §§ 77, 78, 98.
68. Schouler, Husband and Wife, p. 21, § 13; Bishop, Marriage,
Divorce and Separation, §§ 258, 259.
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sometimes regarded as a mere ground for divorce. At common
law a marriage was void if either party was incapable of intelligently consenting, either by reason of insanity or intoxication
or by reason of non-age. Where one marries again who has at
the time of the second marriage a husband or wife living, the
first marriage being valid and not dissolved by divorce, the second
marriage is void and not merely voidable. Where there exists
a relationship between the parties within the prohibited degrees
of the Levitical law, such a marriage was voidable merely and
not void at common law. The same was true when either party
was physically incapable.0 9 Difference of race did not at common law prevent a marriage from being valid. However, mar70
riages between slaves are void.
In Missouri marriages between parents and children, including grandparents and grandchildren of every degree, between
brothers and sisters of the half as well as of the whole blood
and between uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews, first cousins,
white persons and negroes, and white persons and Mongolians
are prohibited and declared absolutely void. 71 This prohibition
applies to illegitimate as well as to legitimate children and
relatives. It is also a crime for negroes and whites to marry.7 2
Also marriages where either of the parties has a former wife or
husband living are void unless the former marriage has been
dissolved. 73 Such marriages, also, except under certain conditions may be made the basis of a criminal charge.74 Bigamy
was made a crime early in the history of Missouri. 75 Incest was
made a crime somewhat later 76 and in 1845 incestuous marriages were declared void, 77 and marriages of white persons and
negroes or mulattoes illegal and void.78 In 1855 the marriage of
69. Tiffany, Persons, pp. 16, 18-26; Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and
:Separation, § 285.
70. Johnson v. Johnson (1870) 45 Mo. 595.
71. Revised Statutes 1909, § 8280.
72. Revised Statutes 1909, § 4727.
73. Revised Statutes 1909, § 8281.
74. Revised Statutes 1909, § 4720.

75. Revised Statutes 1825, p.305, § 75.
76. Revised Statutes 1835, p. 206, § 6.
77. Revised Statutes 1845, p. 729, § 2.
78. Revised Statutes 1845, p. 729, § 3.
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a white person with a negro or a mulatto was made a misdemeanor, 79 and it was declared that such a marriage when one
of the parties had a husband or wife living should not be
80
deemed valid.
In 1865 it was enacted that incestuous marriages and marriages between white persons and negroes are absolutely void,
while bigamous marriages are declared void. s ' This distinction
in phraseology has persisted but it is doubtful whether there
is any real difference in meaning between "absolutely void" and
"void." A marriage "absolutely void" is void but no more so
than one which is simply "void." 82 However, when other distinctions between the two sorts of marriages are considered this
difference in phraseology may be entitled to some weight.
In Virginia under a statute providing that the issue of a
marriage declared null in law shall nevertheless be legitimate,
it was held that the issue of a marriage, void because one of the
parties was already married, were legitimate, but the court
intimated that the issue of a marriage of a white person and a
negro would not be legitimate.8 3 It has been held in Missouri
from an early day that the issue of a marriage one of the parties to which has a husband or wife living, are legitimate 84 and
this is true whether the second marriage is ceremonial or by the
common law.85 Such a marriage is void and the conclusion
that the issue are legitimate seems unquestionably sound. But
the legitimacy of children born of a union between a white person and a negro cannot be so easily disposed of, even assuming
the existence of a ceremonial marriage between them or of cir79. Revised Statutes 1855, p. 1062, §§ 3, 4.
80. Revised Statutes 1855, p. 1062, § 5.
81. General Statutes 1865, p. 458, §§ 2, 3.
82. No difference in meaning is suggested in Keen v. Keen (1904)
184 Mo. 358, where such a difference would have been important.
83. Stones v. Keeling (Va., 1804) 5 Call 143, 148. "The law concerning marriages is to be construed and understood in relation to those persons only to whom the law relates; and not to a class of persons clearly
not within the idea of the legislature when contemplating the subjects of
marriage and legitimacy." Cf. Greenhow v. James (1885) 80 Va. 636,
dissenting opinion of RICiRDSON, J., p. 647.
84. Linecum v. Linecum (1834) 3 Mo. 441; Dyer v. Brannock (1877)
66 Mo. 391; Prattv. Pratt (1876) 5 Mo. App. 539; Green v. Green (1894)
122 Mo. 17.
85. Nelson v. Jones (1912) 245 Mo. 579.
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cumstances which in the case of cohabitation between persons
both white or both black would show the existence of a common
law marriage. If there is neither the semblance of a ceremonial or of a common law marriage, if the intercourse is
merely casual or meretricious, the issue are of course illegitimate.
It is only where there is a marriage that the issue are legitimate.
Even if there is such a marriage it is and has been since 1865
"absolutely void" while a bigamous marriage between persons
of the same race is simply "void." Also an existing marriage
is a ground for divorce, and divorce does not affect the legitimacy
of the children of such marriage, but disparity of race has never
been a ground for divorce.86 Wholly aside from any considerations of public policy not reduced to statutory form, due to a
repugnance to the union of blacks and whites in marriages, these
differences tho some of them may be slight in themselves seem
to point to the existence of a legislative policy which would
justify the courts in, holding, and perhaps even require them to
hold, that while the issue of a bigamous marriage between persons of the same race are legitimate the issue of a marriage
between blacks and whites are not. A white man and a white
woman may marry lawfully unless one or the other has a spouse
living from whom there has been no divorce, but blacks and
whites cannot marry under any circumstances and it does not seem
that the statute, when all of the legislation upon the subject is
taken into consideration, should be held to make the issue of such
marriages legitimate. Of the justice of a legislative policy
which so punishes the innocent offspring even of an abhorrent
connection, nothing.is said. All of this applies as well to the
offspring of incestuous marriages and of marriages between
white persons and Mongolians as it does to the offspring of marriages between blacks and whites.
In Keen v. Keen, s 7 the Supreme Court of Missouri considered for the first time the status of children born of a
86.

Revised Statutes Missouri 1909, § 2370.

This has been the

law since 1807. See Territorial Laws, p. 90. Does this require that
"void" in Revised Statutes 1909, § 8281 is to be construed as "voidable,"
i. e., valid until set aside? See Eubanks v. Banks (1866) 34 Ga. 407.
87. (1904) 184 Mo. 358.
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union between a white man and a negro woman. The man purchased the woman as a slave and cohabited with her until 1883.
Eight children were born, some before and some after the general emancipation of 1865. Inasmuch as the woman was a slave
when the cohabitation began, there could not possibly have been,
owing to her lack of capacity which would have prevented her
from marrying even a negro 88 independently of the statute prohibiting it, any lawful marriage either common law or ceremonial.
Their cohabitation continued, however, long after the general
emancipation of slaves in 1865. But even then tho the woman
could have married a negro she could not lawfully have married
a white man. A connection between a white man and a white
woman which originally was meretricious because of some impediment to a lawful union may presumptively become lawful if cohabitation continues after the impediment is removed.8 9 The circumstances in Keen v. Keen indicate that this would have happened had the parties both been white. The Supreme Court held,
however, that inasmuch as there never could have been a lawful
marriage between the parties, the children, even those born after
the general emancipation of slaves, were not legitimate. It may
be answered to this that the children of a bigamous marriage are
legitimate, notwithstanding that their parents are incapable of
marrying, and the only reply seems to be that the statutes to which
reference has been made seem to require, or at least to permit,
a distinction between the two kinds of cases.90
4.

Children of Slave Marriages. A marriage

between

slaves is void because of absence of capacity,"1 and the children of
88. Johnson v. Johnson (1870) 45 Mo. 595.
89. Adger v. Ackerman (1902) 115 Fed. 124, 129. See 1 Bishop,
Marriage, Divorce, and Separation, c. XXXII, p. 419.
90. Of. Keen v. Keen (1906) 201 U. S. 319. This is the same case
as Keen v. Keen (1904) 184 Mo. 358. In the Supreme Court of the
United States, the contention was made that the Missouri courts had
found the existence of facts sufficient to require them to hold that there
was a common law marriage between the white man and the negro
woman, and as this was void, the children were under what is now
Revised Statutes 1909, § 342 legitimate and entitled to inherit from their
father; and that the refusal so to hold, had deprived the children of
their property without due process of law. The Supreme Court of the
United States held that no federal question was involved and dismissed
the writ of error.
91. Johnson v. Johnson (1870) 45 Mo. 595.
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such marriage are accordingly not legitimate. 92 However, if the
parties to the marriage were emancipated and cohabited after the
emancipation and continued to acknowledge each other as husband and wife the marriage became binding,93 but perhaps only
from the time of emancipation. Children subsequently born are,
of course, legitimate. Whether children born before emancipation
are legitimated by the marriage after emancipation and recognition by the father, is not clear. But this is settled by a statute 94
which declares that the children of slave parents who were living
together in good faith as man and wife at the time of the birth of
such children, are to be taken as legitimate, children of such
parents and that all children of one slave mother are to be deemed
lawful brothers and sisters. The slave parents must, however,
have gone thru the form of marriage or have lived together as man
and wife. Children born of a casual intercourse are not legitimate under this statute; but where the connection is something
more than that, even tho the master separates the slave parents
and directs their marriage or cohabitation with others, children
of all such connections are legitimate. 96
II

ILLEGITIMACY

By the common law a bastard was said to be filius nullius.
He was no more the legitimate child of his mother than of his
father. He could not inherit from either, nor from the legitimate
children of his parents. He might transmit an inheritance but he
could not receive one. He was not a member of the family of
either his father or his mother, but he might establish a new family
for himself and his children born in lawful wedlock were legitimate and his only heirs.9 6
This state of the law has been changed by statute in many
states. In Missouri, the statute provides that bastards are capable
of inheriting and transmitting inheritance on the part of the
92.
93.

94.

But see Lee v. Lee (1901) 161 Mo. 62, 56, 57.
Johnson v. Johnson (1870) 45 Mo. 595.

Revised Statutes 1909, § 344.

This was first enacted in 1865..

Laws of 1865, p. 22, § 2.
95. Lee v. Lee (1901) 161 Mo. 52.
96. 2 Kent, Commentaries (11th ed.) 212.
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mother and that the mother may inherit from her bastard child
or children in like manner as if they had been lawfully begotten
of her.9 7 In Bent's Administrator v. St. Vrain,98 it was held that
the real estate of an illegitimate son did not, upon his death, pass
to his mother or to his illegitimate brother. This is not now the law
as to the mother and she may now inherit from her illegitimate
child.9 9 In Moore v. Moore,100 it was held that under the present
statute an illegitimate child could inherit real estate from a brother
of his deceased mother and the court vigorously criticised Bent's
Administrator v. St. Vrain, and intimated that, in its opinion,
that case should have been decided differently even tho the amendment of 1865 had not then been made. In Marshall v. Wabash
Railway Co., 10 1 it was held that the mother of an illegitimate
child may sue for damages for the wrongful death of such child
under a statute which, in case the person killed was a minor and
unmarried, permitted suit by the father and mother, and if either
of them be dead, by the survivor. The court said that the statute "does not, it is true, legitimate a bastard, but it concedes to
him inheritable blood on the mother's side." Once admitting, as
was done in Moore v. Moore, that an illegitimate child may inherit
from its mother's relatives, it is difficult to see just wherein, the
position of a bastard, so far as its mother is concerned, differs
from that of her legitimate children. In Bent's Administrator v.
St. Vrain, it was held that the estate of one illegitimate child could
not be inherited by another illegitimate child of the same mother.
But perhaps, in view of Moore v. Moore, it can be said that this
case no longer states the law. If a bastard may inherit from
his mother's brother from whom the mother herself might have
inherited, it would seem to follow that he may also inherit from
his mother's child from whom she might have inherited, whether
the child be legitimate or illegitimate, if the conditions established
97. Revised Statutes 1909, § 340. This statute, with the omission
of "and such mother may Inherit from her bastard child or children",
was passed in 1822. Territorial Laws, p. 857, § 7, Revision of 1825, p.
328, § 7. The words quoted were added in 1865. General Statutes
1865, P. 518, § 9.
98. (1860) 30 Mo. 268.
99. General Statutes 1865, p. 518, § 9, Revised Statutes 1909, § 340.
100. (1902) 169 Mo. 432.
101. (1894) 120 Mo. 275.
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by tle statutes as to descents and distributions 102 have been
satisfied. If this be true, what differences are there between the
positions of legitimate and illegitimate children, so far as the
mother is concerned? So far as inheritance is concerned, there
seems to be none. As the mother is the natural guardian of her
illegitimate children whether the father is dead or alive, 10 3 and
as she is entitled to the custody and services of her illegitimate
children during minority 104 and perhaps is bound to support
them, 10 5 it is not going too far to say that the law has
placed illegitimate children in the same position so far as their
mother is concerned as that of her legitimate children whose
father is dead.
III

ADOPTION

The status of adoption was unknown to the common law. 10
It is even now unknown to the law of England,10 7 Scotland and
Holland, and of other European countries as well. It is not
recognized in Canada, except in New Brunswick.108 It seems
strange that this should be the case, as adoption seems to have
been an institution of great importance and significance in the
primitive law of all Aryan peoples. It existed among the Greeks
and Romans, 10 9 among the Germanic tribes, 110 and it exists and
102. Revised Statutes 1909, § 332 et seq.
103. Revised Statutes 1909, § 403.
104. Tiffany, Persons, 225; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Sanders
(Miss., 1913) 61 So. 309.
105. See the dictum in Marshall v. Wabash Railway Co. (1894) 120
Mo. 275, 282.
106. Sarazin v. Union Pacific Ry. Co. (1900) 153 Mo. 479; Lynn
v. Hockaday (1901) 162 Mo. 111; Hockaday v. Lynn (1906) 200 Mo. 456;
Ross v. Ross (1880) 129 Mass. 243, 262; Tiffany, Persons, p. 221. The
suggestion to the contrary in Lindsley v. Patterson (1915) 177 S. W.
826, is probably due to a failure to distinguish between adoption as a

status and a contract to adopt, altho even a contract to adopt, insofar

as It purports to involve a transfer of parental rights and duties is
probably void at common law. Humphreys v. Polak (1901) 2 K. B. 385.

107.

17 Halsbury, Laws of England, 111; Dicey, Conflict of Laws

(2d ed.) p. 461, note 2.
108. 2 Burge, Colonial and Foreign Laws (new ed.) pp. 405, 506.
109. 1 Encyclopedia Brittanica (11th ed.) 213.

110. Brissaud, History of French Private Law (Howell's translation) p. 217.
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has existed from the earliest times among the Hindus. 1 ' Perhaps its origin was due primarily to religious considerations based
on ancestor worship, the adopted son being regarded just as tho
he were a natural son of the adopting parent and hence just as
112
capable of carrying on the worship of the family ancestors.
It also served as a method of providing for a disposition of property after death, at a time when no power or only a limited power
113
of testation existed.
1.

Creation of the Status. In the United States, adoption

1
was made possible at an early day in Louisiana and Texas, 4
and it has now become a part of the law of most if not all of
the states." 5 The Missouri statute was enacted in 1857 116 and
provided that "if any person in this state shall desire to adopt
any child or children as his or her heir and 117 devisee,"" it
shall be iawful for such person to do the same by deed, which
deed shall be executed, acknowledged 119 and recorded in the
county of the residence of the person executing the same, as in
the case of conveyance of real estate." 120 These statutes, being

111.

Maine, Early Law and Custom, 96.

112. Brissaud, History of French Private Law, p. 217.
113. Maine, Ancient Law (original ed.) 188; Sohm, Institutes of
Roman Law (2d ed., Ledlie's translation) p. 529. On the history of
adoption, see Hockaday v. Lynn (1906) 200 Mo. 456.
114. Ross v. Ross (1880) 129 Mass. 243, 262.
115. 1 Stimson, American Statute Law, §§ 6640-6651. For the
distinction between adoption under the Roman Law and under modern
American statutes, see Reinders v. Koppelman (1876) 68 Mo. 462;
Woodward's Appeal (1908) 81 Conn. 152. Adoption under these statutes
has many resemblances to Justinian's "adoptio minus plena." See
Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law (2d ed.) p. 501. The conditions under
which the status of adoption may be created under the modern civil
codes of Europe are much more restricted than under the American
statutes. 2 Burge, Colonial and Foreign Laws, p. 391.
116. Laws of 1857, p. 59, General Statutes 1865, p. 478, §§ 1, 2, 3.
117. "And" was changed to "or" in Revised Statutes 1889, § 968.
118. The words "or devises" were omitted in the statute enacted
in 1909. Laws 1909, p. 130.
119. Amended in 1909, so as to read "and acknowledged by the
person adopting such child or children and recorded", etc. Laws of
1909, p. 134, Revised Statutes 1909, § 1671. The amendments of 1909
are perhaps a tardy recognition of the validity of the criticisms as to
the form of the act of 1857, made in Matter of Clements (1883) 78 Mo.
352 and in Moran v. Stewart (1894) 122 Mo. 295.
120. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1875, which
prohibited the passage of special acts of adoption, Art. 4, § 53 (9),
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in derogation of the common law, are to be strictly construed, 12 1
but in the application of this principle the authorities are not
uniform. It has been said that substantial compliance with the
statute or compliance as to essentials is all that is necessary. 12 2 Perhaps this is all that was meant by the statement in
Hockaday v. Lynn 123 that "strict construction . . . is not
extended to the act of adoption itself" which is to be "liberally
construed in favor of the child." However, it has been held
that the provisions of the statute are mandatory and cannot be
24
departed from.
In Missouri, the deed of adoption must be executed, acknowledged and recorded as in the case of conveyances of real estate. 125
The status of adoption cannot be created by an unacknowledged
1 27
deed 120 but such instrument may be a valid contract to adopt.
A deed of adoption is valid even tho the parents of the child
have not consented or joined in the deed; 128 nor is it necessary
that the wife of the adopting father should join in the execution
of the deed or consent to the adoption.' 29 If she does not join,
the deed is void as to her but valid as to her husband. 130 Nor
does it seem necessary that the consent of the child should be
given or that the deed should be approved by a court except in
two instances. Where the child is an orphan and without a
adoption was occasionally accomplished by special act of the legislature.
See Davis v. Hendricks (1889) 99 Mo. 478.
121. Sarazin v. Union Pacific Ry. Co. (1900) 153 Mo. 479; Lynn v.
Hockaday (1901) 162 Mo. 111; Hockaday v. Lynn (1906) 200 Mo. 456;
Bresser v. Saarman (1901) 112 Ia. 720; Long v. Dufur (Ore., 1911) 113
Pac. 59.
122. Ferguson v. Herr (1902) 64 Neb. 649, 659; Purinton v. Jamroclk
(1907) 195 Mass. 187.
123.

(1906)

200 Mo. 456, 464.

124. Burnes v. Burnes (1904) 132 Fed. 485. See also, In Re Carroll's Estate (Pa., 1908) 68 Atl. 1038.
125. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1671. As to the execution and recording of conveyances of real estate, see Revised Statutes 1909, §§ 2792,
2794, 2796-99, 2809.
126. Sarazin v. Union Pacific Ry. Co. (1900) 153 Mo. 479; Lamb v.
Morrow (1908) 140 Ia. 89.
127. Healey V. Simpson (1892) 113 Mo. 340.
128. Matter o1 Clements (1883) 78 Mo. 352; Clarkson v. Hatton
(1898) 143 Mo. 47.
129. Haworth v. Haworth (1907) 123 Mo. App. 303.
130. Burnes v. Burnes (1904) 132 Fed. 485.
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guardian 131 and has not been legally entrusted to any incorporated institution, an application must be made to the probate court
of the county, probably the county where the child lives, tho this
is by no means clear. If the court is satisfied that it is to the best
interest of the child that the application for adoption be granted,
an order to that effect will be entered of record. The person
desiring to adopt the child then executes a deed and the adoption
is completed.' 3 2 Should the child, however, be under seven and
have been placed, either by its parents or otherwise, in the care
of an incorporated institution in Missouri for the care and cusftody of children or of any individual who may conduct such an
institution, and have been abandoned by its parents for two
years, either before or after its entry into the institution, the
principal officer of the institution may, with the approval of the
probate court of the county or city in which the institution is,
execute a deed of adoption to any proper person or persons who
138
must join in the deed.
The original name of the adopted child does not have to
appear in the deed of adoption if its identity is otherwise indicated with sufficient certainty. 134 The probate court of the
proper county may order in its discretion a change in the name
1 5
of any adopted child.
There seems to be no limitation upon the age of the person
adopted. A person over twenty-one may be adopted 136 as well
as a person under that age. There is no objection to the adoption of a child by an unmarried man. 13 7

Perhaps the adopting

parent must have capacity enough to convey real estate in order
to execute a deed of adoption, as the statute requires that the
deed must be executed, acknowledged and recorded as in the
case of a conveyance of real estate. Hence, the adopting parent
131. As to guardians of children, see Revised Statutes 1909, § 403.
132. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1678.
133. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1675. This first appears in Revised
Statutes 1899, § 5250.
134. Fosburgh v. Rogers (1893) 114 Mo. 122.
135. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1674.
136. In re Moran (1899) 151 Mo. 555.
137. Higberg v. St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co. (1912) 164
Mo. App. 514, 564.
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if a man must be twenty-one years old, and if a woman,
eighteen.138 A married woman may adopt by joining in a deed
of adoption with her husband.1 39 It is not clear whether the
statute requires that the husband must also adopt at the same
time or whether he joins merely for the purpose of showing
his consent to the adoption by his wife. Nor does it seem clear
whether the statute deprives a married woman, in view of the
removal of the restrictions upon her capacity to contract and
to convey her real estate, 140 of what would otherwise seem to
be her right to adopt by her own deed as fully as tho she were
unmarried. A child may be adopted by more than one person
and thereby becomes the adopted child of all its adopting parents,
41
even tho they may not be husband and wife.'
Can the status of adoption be created in any other way than
by a deed? The question as to the necessity for a deed was
raised in Martin v. Martin 142 where it was held to be unnecessary to decide it, but in Lindsley v. Patterson143 it was said,
tho it was not necessary to the decision, that the status of mother
and child was created by words, letters and conduct, in the absence of a deed of adoption, thus intimating that there is a common law method of adoption distinct and apart from the statutory
one. Adoption is a status and not a contract 144 just as marriage is a status and not a contract, 145 altho a contract may have
preceded it. As the status created by adoption is like that of
parent and natural child or at least like that of ancestor and
heir, 140 the respective rights and obligations of adopted child
and adopting parent may be affected and changed by contract
just as in the case of parent and natural child, or ancestor and
heir, and it is probably immaterial whether the contract is made
before or after the creation of the status, differing in this respect from the contracts affecting the status of husband and
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

144.
145.
146.
3

Revised Statutes 1909, § 402.
Revised Statutes 1909, § 1672.
Revised Statutes 1909, § 8304.
Burnes v. Burnes (1904) 132 Fed. 485.
(1913) 250 Mo. 539, 550.
(1915) 177 S.W. 826, 832.
Re Ziegler (1913) 143 N. Y. S. 562.
Tiffany, Persons, p. 4. But see Revised Statutes 1909, § 8279.
Tiffany, Persons, pp. 222-3. See also, infra, p. -.
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wife. Even if the contract is contained in the deed of adoption
and is void for want of consideration, this does not affect the
validity of the adoption, and the status is created notwithstanding. 147 It would seem, therefore, that as- adoption was not possible by the common law and came into the law only by means
of a statute, that the statutory method of adoption is exclusive.
In no other way has the law provided for the creation of the
status. It is believed that there is no decision in, Mis-souri to
the contrary, notwithstanding the fact that in Lynn v. Hockaday 148 a decree was entered declaring the plaintiff who claimed
to have been adopted by oral agreement the duly adopted child
of the one who had agreed to adopt her. It is necessary, therefore, that the decisions should be carefully examined.
A promise to make a will in favor of a particular person
either leaving him all or a specific thing or an undivided share
of the estate of the promissor is valid, if supported by a consideration, and will be specifically enforced against heirs, devisees, or
purchaseTs with notice. 149 Such an agreement does not seem
to be within the statute of frauds, 1 0 and even if it were 151 a
court of equity would find no difficulty in decreeing specific performance if there were part performance sufficient to take it out
of the statute. 52 If the consideration for the agreement is to
take care of the promissor during his life, 153 or to live with him
as a dutiful child or as his own child,' 154 full performance on the
part of the promissee is regarded as sufficient to enable him to
enforce the agreement, even tho it is oral.
Fugate v. Allen (1906) 119 Mo. App. 183.
(1901) 162 Mo. 111, 127.
149. Wright v. Turley (1860) 30 Mo. 389; Gupton v. Gupton (1870)
47 Mo. 37; Van Dyne v. Vreeland (1857) 11 N. J. Eq. 370, (1858) 12
N. J. Eq. 142; Fry, Specific Performance (5th ed.) p. 114.
150. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2783. See also Lynn v. Hockaday
147.
148.

(1901) 162 Mo. 111, 125.
151. In Sitton v. Shipp (1877) 65 Mo. 297, an oral agreement to
convey land by deed in consideration that plaintiffs would take care of
promissor during her life, was enforced.
152. Nowack v. Berger (1896) 133 Mo. 24; Martin v. Martin (1913)
250 Mo. 539.
153. Gupton v. Gupton (1870) 47 Mo. 37; Teats v. Flanders (1893)
118 Mo. 660; Alexander v. Alexander (1899) 150 Mo. 579.
154. Sutton v. Haydon (1876) 62 Mo. 101; Sharkey v. McDermott
(1887) 91 Mo. 647; Lynn v. Hockaday (1901) 162 Mo. 111; McElwain v.
McElwain (1902) 171 Mo. 244.
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It is a short step from a promise to devise or bequeath
property to a promise to adopt and a still shorter step if the
promise is both to adopt and devise or bequeath property. It
would seem that the first case in Missouri in which there was
both an agreement to adopt and an agreement to devise or
bequeath property is Sutton v. Haydon.1 56 The promissor, whose
interest in the property remaining at her decease was equitable,
failed to leave anything to the plaintiff. It was held that plaintiff
was entitled to a decree of specific performance against the
promissor's heirs. No stress was laid upon the agreement to
adopt and it does not clearly appear that the plaintiff had not been
adopted.
In Sharkey v. McDermott,15 6 there was a similar agreement
to adopt and leave property, but no deed of adoption had been
executed. The petition prayed to have the plaintiff's right to
adoption established and that the plaintiff be declared the heir
of the promissor. Upon demurrer it was held that the petition
stated a cause of action, 157 and that the plaintiff's right sprang
from an agreement which was not merely and solely one to adopt
but was in part one to leave property at the death of the promissor. The fact that no adoption had taken place did not deprive
the plaintiff of her right to the property she had been promised.
In Healey v. Simpson,' S s a similar case, it was said that altho
the written contract, specific performance of which was asked,
did not operate as an adoption, "it can operate as a contract for
adoption, which may, upon a proper showing, be specifically
The court cited Wright v. Turley, 159
enforced in equity".
Gupton v. Gupton 160 and Sutton v. Haydon,16 1 the first two
of which cases do not involve any question of adoption, and in
the last altho there was an agreement to adopt as well as to leave
property, property rights alone were involved. Thus, it would
155.
156.
157.
Sharkey
158.
159.
160.
161.

(1876) 62 Mo. 101.
(1887) 91 Mo. 647.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals had held the contrary ts
v. McDermott (1884) 16 Mo. App. 80.
(1892) 113 Mo. 340, 346.
(1860) 30 Mo. 389.
(1870) 47 Mo. 37.
(1876) 62 Mo. 101.
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seem that the language previously quoted from Healey v. Simpson 162 is not to be taken to refer to the creation of the status
by a mere contract to adopt, but to the specific performance
of an agreement to leave property by will. This is also true of
Steele v. Steele 163 in which the agreement was to adopt and to
leave property.10 4 Even should adoption be impossible, because
of the absence of a statute authorizing it, the contract to leave
property will be enforced altho there may also have been an
agreement to adopt.1 65
It may not always be easy to determine whether there is
a contract to leave property by will.16 6 In Davis v. Hendricks,10 7
the child was adopted by means of a special act of the legislature, obtained in fulfilment of an agreement between the child's
natural father and the adopting father to the effect that the
latter would adopt the child and make her his heir. It was held
that there was nothing in the agreement which prevented the
adopting parent from disposing of his whole estate by a will
which gave nothing to the child. The agreement involved nothing more than would be involved in a completed adoption and
an adopted child has no greater right to insist upon sharing in
the property of its adopting parent in case it is disposed of
by will than has a natural child. It is difficult to see why there
should be a different result if there has been no adoption, but
merely an agreement to make the child an heir. An agreement
to make one an heir is perhaps nothing more than an agreement
to adopt 168 and the same is probably true of an agreement to
take the child as a lawful child and to give it a share with the
natural children of the promissor in the distribution of his
estate. 10 9
(1892) 113 Mo. 340.
(1901) 161 Mo. 566.
See also, Van Dyne v. Vreeland (1857) 11 N. J. Eq. 370 (1858)
Eq. 142; Starnes v. Hatcher (Tenn., 1908) 117 S. W. 219;
Peterson v. Bauer (1909) 83 Neb. 405.
165. Godine v. Kidd (1892) 19 N. Y. Supp. 335.
166. Bowins v. English (1904) 138 Mich. 178.
167. (1889) 99 Mo. 478.
162.
163.
164.
12 N. J.

168.

Pemberton v. Perrin (1913)

169.

Healey v. Simpson (1892)

(1896)

94 Neb. 718.

113 Mo. 340; Nowack v. Berger

133 Mo. 24; Westerman v. Schmidt (1899)

80 Mo. App. 344;
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What, then, is the effect of an agreement merely to adopt
which does not include an agreement to leave property? There
seems to be no valid reason why the child should not be given in
equity the rights of an adopted child in the property of the one
who promised to adopt it but who failed to execute a deed. If the
promissor leaves a will then the child can get nothing in equity,
unless it is to be regarded as a pretermitted child under the
17 1
it
statute.' 70 As an adopted child would be so regarded,
seems to follow that a child whose rights arise only from a contract to adopt should be placed in the same position. 172 Hence,
if there is an intestacy the child will get in equity whatever it
73
would have been entitled to had it been adopted by deed.'
Even in an action at law a contract to adopt may make it possible
for the child to urge those defenses which a legally adopted child
might urge, but only if equitable defenses are permitted in. actions at law. 174 The rights of the child, however, arise out of
the contract and do not flow from status, because no status has
been created. As in all the cases cited the one who promised to
adopt was dead when the suit for specific performance was
instituted, the status could not possibly have been created by the
17
decree. 5
But suppose a suit is brought against the promissor during
his life asking that the court order him to specifically perform
his agreement to adopt by executing the deed of adoption required by the statute. It is doubtful if a cause of action arises
until the death of the promissor, 76 at which time the status cannot possibly, be created, but no case in Missouri or elsewhere
Lynn v. Hockaday (1901) 162 Mo. 111; Martin v. Martin (1913) 250 Mo.
539.

170. Revised Statutes 1909, § 544.

171. Fugate v. Allen (1906) 119 Mo. App. 183; Horton v. Troll
(1914) 183 Mo. App. 677.
172. Thomas v. Maloney (1910) 142 Mo. App. 193.
173. Healey .v. Simpson (1892) 113 Mo. 340; Lynn v. Hockaday
(1901) 162 Mo. 111; Martin v. Martin (1913) 250 Mo. 539; Horton v.
Troll (1914) 183 Mo. App. 677; Lindsley v. Patterson (1915) 177 S. W.
826; Roberts v. Roberts (1915) 223 Fed. 775. See also Van Tine v. Van
Tine (N. J. 1888) 15 Atl. 249; Crawford v. Wilson (1913) 139 Ga. 654;
Herrick's Estate (1913) 124 Minn. 85.
174. Godine v. Kidd (1892) 19 N. Y. Supp. 335.
175. Starnes v. Hatcher (Tenn., 1908) 117 S. W. 219.
176. Horton v. Troll (1914) 183 Mo. App. 677.
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has been found involving the exact point. Beach v. Bryan 177
comes very near it. There an oral agreement was made by the
plaintiffs with the defendant, who was the mother of the child,
by which the plaintiffs agreed to adopt it, the mother agreeing
to relinquish her right to the control and custody of the child.
Subsequently the mother refused to execute the deed of adoption and finally took the child away from the plaintiffs, who thereupon brought suit asking that the court decree that the child
was the lawful adopted child of the plaintiffs and that the
defendant be held to have relinquished all claims which she may
have had to its control and custody. The court found that there
was no evidence that the mother had agreed to surrender the
custody of the child to the plaintiffs, but it said that courts of
equity deal only with property rights and further that there
were no property rights involved except in the suggestion that
the plaintiffs might be entitled to the earnings of the child until
he attained his majority; and as to this it was intimated that
tho an agreement for personal service cannot be specifically performed possibly a recovery in damages might be had. The court
said, -however, that even had the contract been established, no
decree for its specific performance was possible.
It would seem to follow, therefore, that in so far as a
contract to adopt involves mere property rights, arising upon the
death of the person who made the agreement to adopt, a contract for adoption may be specifically enforced and the child may
be regarded in equity as entitled to all the property rights it
would have been entitled to had it been legally adopted. But
so far as the contract to adopt may involve a change of custody
and control, the admission of the child to the family of the
promissor and any other matters not involving questions of
property, the contract cannot be specifically enforced.
It seems unquestionable that an action at law for damages
will lie for the breach of the contract to adopt, and in view
of the fact that specific performance of the agreement will be
decreed so far as it affects property rights, it is not improbable
that the measure of damages will be the value of the interest the
177.

(1911) 155 Mo. App. 33.
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child has lost by reason of the failure to adopt it. In Pennsylvania, however, where the only decisions upon this question have
been found, the measure of damages is held to be the value of
the services performed or the outlay incurred by the child on the
178
strength of the promise.
Since the enactment in 1889 of the statute conferring upon
married women a capacity to contract as femmes sole,'7 9 there
seems to be no question that a married woman is bound by
her contract to adopt. A question may be raised, however, as
to whether a contract to adopt made by her in which her husband
has not joined, may be enforced against her. If the statute
furnishes the only method by which she may legally adopt, i.e.,
by a deed in which her husband joins, i8 0 perhaps a contract to
adopt is not binding upon her unless her husband either joins
in it or in some way consents. In all of the cases found except
Lindsley v. Patterson,'I the husband joined in the contract, and
there he probably consented afterwards, but the decision would
seem to indicate that even this is unnecessary.
But if such a contract was made before 1889 the question
of its enforcement presents more difficult problems. In Sharkey
v. McDermott 182 the promise to adopt and to leave property
was made by a man and his wife. 8 3 The man died leaving all
of his property to his widow and she subsequently died intestate.
Apparently the contract upon which the suit was brought was
made by the wife after the death of her husband upon a new
and adequate consideration. 18 4 As she was then under no disaability, the contract was clearly binding upon her. But the court
further held that even if this was not the case, the wife took
the property subject to the rights of the plaintiff created by the
contract with her husband and hence in either case the result
would be the same. In Horton v. Troll,'8 5 there seems to have
178. 8andham v. Grounds (1899) 94 Fed. 83; In re Carroll'sEstate
(Penn., 1908) 68 AtI. 1038.
179. Revised Statutes 1909, § 8304.
180. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1672.
181. (Mo., 1915) 177 S. W. 826, 829.
182. (1887) 91 Mo. 647.
183. See Sharkey v. McDermott (1884) 16 Mo. App. 80.
184. Sharkey v. McDermott (1887) 91 Mo. 647, 653.
185. (1914) 183 Mo. App. 677.
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been no evidence of a new contract upon a new consideration
made by the married woman after she became discovert, but the
court held that "ratification after removal of disability of coverture is valid." 186 Whether or not she could so ratify would seem
to depend upon the further question whether prior to 1889 the
contracts of a married woman are void or voidable. If void
they cannot be ratified but if merely voidable they may. However, contracts made with special reference to the separate estate
of married women charge such estates in equity without refer187
ence to the question whether they are void or voidable at law.
The contracts of a married woman were regarded as void at
common law.' 8 8 It has recently been said that the contracts of
married women made prior to 1889 were not void in Missouri
but voidable,' 8 9 but the Missouri cases cited in support of this
statement do not seem fully to sustain it. The question as to
whether an executory contract made by a married woman prior
to 1889 is valid and enforceable against her is beyond the scope
of this study.
In Lindsley v. Patterson, 19o the contract to adopt was made

by the married woman alone and the contract was enforced
against the married woman's estate upon the ground that she had
ratified it by words and conduct after discoverture resulting from
divorce. There seems to have been no new promise and no new
consideration. She seems, however, to have been possessed of
a separate estate, and perhaps the decision holding that her
estate was bound by the contract can be sustained upon the
theory that the contract was intended to charge her separate
estate and was made with special reference thereto, and hence
created a charge which would be valid in equity.'"'
The agreement to adopt, whether with or without a promise
to leave property, must be based upon a valid consideration.
A mother's promise to marry the promissor is regarded as a
186. Horton v. Troll (1914) 183 Mo. App. 677, 690.
187. 1 Parsons, Contracts (9th ed.) * 368.
188. 1 Parsons, Contracts (9th ed.) * 345.
189. Lindsley v. Patterson (Mo., 1915) 177 S. W. 826, 829.
190. (Mo., 1915) 177 S. W. 826, 829.
191. De Baun v. Wagoner (1874) 56 Mo. 347.
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valid consideration for his promise to adopt her child.1 92 But a
promise that the child should be an equal heir with the promissor's own children given in consideration of the promise of the
child's father to surrender the custody and control of the child,
is unenforceable for want of consideration if the father had no
right to the custody of the child by reason of a divorce decree
93
which had given the custody to the mother.'
A contract to make a will, or to leave property, or to adopt
must be proved by evidence that is "cogent, clear and convincing", 194 establishing the existence of the contract beyond a reasonable doubt. 195 There is probably no objection to the proof
of such a contract by circumstantial evidence, but the circumstances should be consistent only with the existence of an agreement to adopt or to leave property. The mere fact that an
orphan child is taken into the family of a stranger is not necessarily consistent only with an agreement to adopt or to make
a will in the child's favor. 19 6 Whether Roberts v. Roberts 1'"
and Lindsley v. Patterson198 are entirely consistent with these
principles, is not clear. It would seem that in view of the great
possibility of imposition in such cases, the courts are justified in
insisting upon proof of the existence of the contract beyond a reasonable doubt.
There is no method provided by the statute for setting
aside an adoption once the status is created. Perhaps, if there
were fraud in the procurement of the adoption or undue influence, 199 a court of equity would set the adoption aside and
192.

Nowack v. Berger (1896) 133 Mo. 24; Martin v. Martin (1913)

250 Mo. 539.
193. Fugate v. Allen (1906) 119 Mo. App. 183.
194. Teats v. Flanders (1893) 118 Mo. 660; McElwain v. McElwain
(1902) 171 Mo. 244; Steele v. Steele (1901) 161 Mo. 566.
195. Grantham v. Gossett (1904) 182 Mo. 651; Wales v. Holden
(1908) 209 Mo. 552.' In both of these cases and in the following it
Teats v. Flanders
was held that the contract was not established:
(1893) 118 Mo. 660; Kinney v. Murray (1902) 170 Mo. 674; McElwain
v. McElwain (1902) 171 Mo. 244; McKee v. Higbee (1904) 180 Mo. 263;
Asbury v. Hicklin (1904) 181 Mo. 658; Rosenwald v. Middlebrook
(1905) 188 Mo. 58; Berg v. Moreau (1906) 199 Mo. 416.
196. Sitton v. Shipp (1877) 65 Mo. 297; Wales v. Holden (1908)
209 Mo. 552.
197. (1915) 223 Fed. 775.
198. (Mo., 1915) 177 S. W. 828.
199. Phillips v. Chase (1909) 203 Mass. 556.
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cancel the deed, just as it would under similar circumstances
cancel and set aside a deed of real estate. There is probably
no way by which the parties to the status can destroy it by
agreement among themselves. A paper executed by the adopting
parent agreeing to permit the mother to have the child whenever she might call for it, is not a revocation of the deed of
200
adoption.
2. Rights of adopting parent. The statutes provide that a
20 1
child may be adopted as the heir of the adopting parent
and that the child shall have "the same right against the person
or persons executing the deed, for support and maintenance and
for proper and humane treatment as a child has, by law, against
lawful partents.20 2 Does this give an adopted child the status
of a child of the adopting parent? The child by adoption certainly has something more than a mere capacity to inherit. It is
entitled to maintenance and support as if it were a legitimate
child. But is the adopting parent entitled to its custody? If the
natural parents consent to a transfer of custody by joining in
the deed of adoption, then the adopting parent is entitled to the
custody of the child as against the natural parents. 20 3 But if
the natural parents do not join, the adopting parent cannot retain
the custody of the child as against them. 20 4 The statute provides, also, that on the same conditions the adopting parent is
20 5
entitled to the services of the child.
If a child under seven years of age has been abandoned and
is adopted from an incorporated institution in Missouri for the
care and custody of minor children, the adopting parent has the
right to both the custody and services of the child.208 If the
child has no guardian and has not been legally entrusted to any
incorporated institution, and has been adopted tinder the direction
of the probate court this adoption will have the effect of giving
200. Matter of Clements (1883) 78 Mo. 352.
201. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1671.
202. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1672.
203. Matter of Clements (1883) 78 Mo. 352. This result has been
confirmed by statute. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1677.
204. Orey v. Moller (1909) 142 Mo. App. 579.
205. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1677.
206. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1675. As to the constitutionality
of a similar statute, see Purtnton v. Jamrock (1907) 195 Mass. 187.
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the adopting parent the right to the custody and services of the
child.207 It cannot, therefore, be said with accuracy that adoption
in all cases puts the adopted child in the position of a natural
child so far as the rights of the adopting parent are concerned.
If the adopted child is living with the adopting parent, the
latter has the same right of reasonable correction as he would
have in the case of his natural children and is subject to the same
20 8
criminal liability in case of its abuse.
Upon the death of a legitimate natural child, intestate and

without a widow or children, its estate will pass to its parents
and its brothers and sisters. 20 9 Upon the death of an adopted
child intestate and without a widow or children, perhaps its
estate does not pass to its adopting parents nor to its brothers
and sisters by adoption, but to its own natural kindred. In
Reinders v. Koppelman,210 a child had been adopted and had
received property as a devisee under the will of its adopting
father. The child then died intestate and childless. It was
held that none of the property received under the will of the
adopting parent passed to the child's relatives by adoption but
all of it went to its blood relatives. This decision has been
criticized211 upon the ground that the statutes of descent and
distribution should be so construed as to prevent what may be
regarded as the injustice of permitting property received from the
adopting parent to pass to persons in whom the adopting parent
had no interest to the exclusion of his own kindred. It has also
been suggested that if the adopted child should die without blood
relatives the property would escheat to the state notwithstanding
that blood relatives of the adopting parent are alive. However,
as there is no provision either in the statutes regulating descent
and distribution or in the statutes providing for adoption directing that the adopting parent or his blood relatives may inherit
under such circumstances, the court was justified in refusing to
read such a provision, into them. It may be suggested that there
207. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1678.
208. State v. Koonse (1907) 123 Mo. App. 655.
209. Revised Statutes 1909, § 832.
210. (1878) 68 Mo. 482.
211. Hockaday v. Lynn (1906) 200 Mo. 456; Humphries v. Davi
(1884) 100 Ind. 274; Tiffany, Persons, p. 224.
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should be a revision of the statutes of descent and distribution
and a re-drafting of the adoption statute so as to give the adopting
parent and his blood relatives rights of succession under such
circumstances. In the case of the adoption of abandoned children
from an institution, as the statute provides that the adopting
parent shall be entitled to all the rights of lawful parents against
212
the child to the exclusion of any rights of its natural parents,
the adopting parent may be entitled to inherit from the adopted
child.
3. Rights of adopted child.2 13 It has been said that an
adopted child may inherit from its adopting parent as tho it
were a legitimate natural child.2 14 Adoption of a child does not
deprive the adopting parent of his power to dispose of his property by deed,2 15 or will,2

16

but as adopted children are children

within the meaning of the statute as to pretermitted
children 217 a will of the adopting parent is void as to the adopted
children unless they are named therein or provided for.2 18 They
are entitled to inherit only from the adopting parent and therefore cannot inherit from a brother of the deceased adopting
2 19
parent.
The question as to whether the descendants of a deceased
adopted child may inherit from the adopting parent seems never
to have been considered. But if an adopted child inherits from
the adopting parent just as tho he were a legitimate child, his
212. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1675. When the adopting father dies
leaving a widow but without a child or other descendants in being,
capable of inheriting, his widow is entitled, among other things, to

one-half of the real and personal estate belonging to the husband at
the time of his death. An adopted child is a child capable of inheriting
within the meaning of this statute. Revised Statutes 1909, § 351; Moran
v. Stewart (1894) 122 Mo. 295, (1895)

132 Mo. 73, (1903)

173 Mo. 207.

213. See a valuable article by Professor Kales on Rights of Adopted
Children, 9 Illinois Law Review 149.
214. Fosburgh v. Rogers (1893) 114 Mo. 122; Clarkson v. Hatton
(1898) 143 Mo. 47.
215. Burnes v. Burnes (1905) 137 Fed. 781; Pemberton v. Perrin
(1913) 94 Neb. 718.
216. Moran v. Stewart (1894) 122 Mo. 295; Waterman v. Schmidt
(1899) 80 Mo. App. 344; Steele v. Steele (1901) 161 Mo. 566.
217. Revised Statutes 1909, § 544.
218. Fugate v. Allen (1906) 119 Mo. App. 183; Thomas v. Maloney
(1901) 142 Mo. App. 193; Horton v. Troll (1914) 183 Mo. App. 677.
219. Hockaday v. Lynn (1906) 200 Mo. 456.
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descendants should inherit just as tho they were descendants of
a legitimate child. An adopted child cannot inherit lands conveyed to its adopting parent and his bodily heirs, nor is it a
child within the meaning of a statute 220 declaring that when a
grantee shall become seised of an estate which would be regarded
under the law of England as an estate tail the grantee shall have
a life estate only and upon his death the land shall go to his
children. 22 1 Nor may an adopted child take under a devise "to
the nearest and lawful heirs of mine and that of my said wife";
2
it was held that the testator meant relatives by blood. 22

It would seem to follow from the decision in Reinders v.
Koppelman 223 that an adopted child may inherit from its natural
parent, for it was there held that upon the death of an adopted
child intestate and childless, its property even tho received by
devise from the adopting parent passed to its relatives by blood.
If such relatives inherit from it, it is probably true that it may
inherit from them. 224

If under the statute providing for the

adoption of abandoned children from an institution the adopting
parent inherits from the child, it may be that the child cannot
inherit from his natural parents as this might result in the transfer
of the estate of the natural parents to the adopted parent.
IV

SUGGESTED

CHANGES

IN

STATUTES

A revision and redrafting of the statutes both as to legitimation and adoption is desirable. Whether all illegitimate children
should be capable of inheriting from their fathers, if recognized,
even tho their parents do not subsequently marry, is not altogether a legal question but involves social considerations beyond
the scope of this study. The presumption of legitimacy should
be given more definiteness than it has now and the sort of
evidence which can be used to rebut it should be made clear.
220. Revised Statutes 1855, p. 355, § 5.
221. Clarkson v. Hatton (1898) 143 Mo. 47. See 1 Law Series,
Missouri Bulletin, p. 21; Kales, Rights of Adopted Children, 9 Illinois
Law Review, pp. 149-153.
222. Reinders v. Koppelman (1887) 94 Mo. 338.
223. (1878) 68 Mo. 482.
224. Of. Burnes v. Burnes (1904) 132 Fed. 485; Clarkson v. Hatton
(1898) 143 Mo. 47, 55.
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This would involve a consideration of the question as to whether
it is desirable to continue or to limit the rule that husband and
wife are disqualified to testify as to lack of marital -intercourse.
The doubts as to the legitimation of adulterine bastards should
be settled. There should be some direct means provided for the
final determination of the legitimacy of children during the life225
time of those who are most vitally concerned.
The statutes permitting adoption do not form a consistent
whole as they should. If adoption is worth being preserved, and
it undoubtedly is, it would seem desirable that it should be complete in all cases and not partial as it is in some. It should be
dependent upon the approval of a court in all cases and not merely
in the two instances of the adoption of children having no
guardian and of abandoned children tinder seven if adopted
from an institution. The consent of the child, which is not
required now in any case, should be required in all cases, if it
is old enough to be able' to give a consent having any significance.
The parents should be made parties to the adoption proceedings,
but if this is impossible in any case, a guardian might be appointed to protect the interests of the child. In this way the
right to the custody and services of the child will be transferred
by every adoption to the adopting parent. In no case should an
adoption be permitted unless it is made to appear that it would
be for the best interests of the child. These requirements would
not unduly restrict the privilege of adoption, but would make it
certain that the rights of the child and of its natural parents
would be protected, and at the same time the rights and obligations of the adopting parent would be defined.
ELDON R. JAMES.
225. At present the determination of a child's legitimacy is usually
postponed until the death of the parent raises a question of inheritance.
An indirect method of determining it might be found in a suit by the
child's guardian for reimbursement for necessaries purchased with the
child's money. After Huke v. Huke (1891) 44 Mo. App. 308, the court
would probably refuse to decree future maintenance. But see Eldred v.
Eldred (1901) 62 Neb. 613, 87 N. W. 340. There seems to be no way
in which the husband of the mother of a child born in wedlock can
initiate a proceeding to finally determine the child's legitimacy or illegitimacy.

